He said it with ease and confidence as if what happened was just a simple traffic accident, e.g. miscalculation on a turn, bad brakes, slippery road, etc. If I were only around when he made that statement, I would have slap him at the back of his head for thinking that all his listeners are ignorant and dim-witted like him.
I find it absurd that aside from navigational error, he’s also blaming the strong current as one factor for the grounding of his vessel. The flow of current usually follows the curvature of the coast and not push the vessel closer to shore, unless the vessel is sailing along the mouth of a river or bay where current is influence by tidal streams. There is a counter flow along the coast but this is usually a reversed direction from the main flow of current. The town of Kiamba is located in a solid mass of land south of Mindanao. Therefore, the only phenomenon that can wash her ashore is a “tsunami”.
The confused 3rd Mate (I wouldn’t be surprised if he is just newly-promoted) took all the blame when he admitted that he did not notice the shallow area of bakud reef that caused the vessel to run aground. He probably thought that by his own admission of fault, he could still save the grim fate of his Captain.
Their incredible stories about strong current and failure to notice the reefs are all shallow alibis to hide the real fact that either no one was on lookout or nobody was attending to the navigation at the time of grounding. The normal practice onboard is to take vessel’s fix position and plot it on the chart at an interval of 30 minutes (some masters prefers every 15 minutes in confined waters). If this was done religiously from the time they departed Australia until they made landfall on the island of Mindanao, the chain and trend of “fixes” alone will provide indication that the vessel is heading or drifting towards the reef. Hence, if they sense nothing wrong with the positions, they must have drawn a course line to pass with a very small clearance to the cluster of corals.
For somebody who do not understand the system and protocol on the bridge during navigation, the 3rd officer, who is usually doing the 8–12 (08:00 am–12 noon, 08:00 pm–12 midnight) sea watch, will appear to be the lone culprit. But this is not the case in bridge organization. The master, owing to the doctrine of “command responsibility”, is held accountable for the accident regardless of whoever is cunning the vessel.
For a ship to run aground under the hot morning sun, in calm seas, clear weather and enough sea room to maneuver is simply mind boggling. She hit the bottom on her starboard side; to her port was the vast open water of Mindanao Sea. Likewise, the master cannot claim that his venturing close to the coast was unintentional. He couldn't have miss it at all. In fact, I am pretty sure everyone onboard may have been overwhelmed by the scenery of the coast. At a distance of 2.5 miles from shore, one can already see the seas breaking unto the rocks, smell the mosses of vegetation and watch the Sarangani monkeys swinging on top of the trees. This scene can be frightening for a novice 3rd mate, but amusing for an experienced, extremely confident navigator like the Captain.
Notwithstanding the grounding incident, the main issue here is not navigating close to shore but the lack of concern over the safety of the ship and her crew. In fact, if I was the master onboard, I would have done the same just to watch Pacquiao’s fight. It is a rare opportunity that I wouldn't want to miss. But my goodness, not when there’s dangerous reefs around the vicinity. It is stupidity in the highest form to jeopardize the safety of the vessel for the sake of a clear TV reception.
Onboard the ship, on the bridge, a navigator uses different method to spot and avoid shallow patches, shoals or reefs. Taking compass bearings or distances from shore by radar (this size of vessel may have at least 2 radars and perhaps an ECDIS) can provide the vessel’s position and determine with accuracy the location of an underwater obstruction. Even without these navigational aids, the trained, keen eye of the lookout, with a good binocular, can easily recognize the conspicuous discoloration of water (see inset photo) far ahead and long before reaching the area of danger. Once visually detected, even at close range, there is always time to take evading action towards the safe side. Therefore, if they altered the course close to the coast and nobody notices the reefs, I can only surmise that the bridge was deserted at the time of grounding. They set the steering to autopilot and everyone went down the recreation room to watch the fight, including the master. Of course, we will never know the truth unless somebody among the crew squeals.
No maritime investigator will believe the master even if he insists that it was solely the decision of the 3rd officer to change course heading towards the reefs. A neophyte navigating officer does not have the guts to plot a course line on his own passing very close to a dangerous coral ridge. Even if what the master’s saying is true, he should have been present on the bridge when passing through the treacherous area of the coast to check the progress of navigation and confirm if the established passage planning is being followed.
I am sure the owner is infuriated by this accident. Damage and penalty claims will rise to millions of dollars, the vessel have had been detained, trading documents suspended, and the charterer may have “off hired” the ship for the delay. They have nobody to blame except the master who took the risk of disregarding their Safety Management System (SMS), particularly in maintaining a safe passing distance from any charted shoals and shallow portion of the coast. Considering the size of Double Prosperity, her deep draft and the presence of bakud reef, the safe passing distance should be at least 6-7 miles from the coast. By now, they must already be re-organizing their company and reviewing their safety navigation policy. Worse, they might also be shopping for a new manning agency to man their vessels.
The master is definitely in deep trouble. Aside from losing his job, he might also be facing not only sanction, suspension but also revocation of his license. It will probably take time before somebody takes the risk of giving him another command. He might as well approach Pacquiao for financial assistance.
Considering the numerous accidents and grounding that occurred in the same area in the past, if the Sarangani provincial government is really determine to protect the seascape of bakud reef and other marine sanctuary of their coast, it is not enough to just resort to imposing fines to deter offenders. They need to install a buoy, equipped with radar reflectors, to the southern end of bakud reef or mark it with an unlighted (lighted is not recommended as fishermen might only steal the batteries) structure, also with radar reflectors, to guide and warn passing by ships of the danger.
ERRATUM
According to latest report, the crew of MV Double Prosperity admitted that the captain permitted the ship to go near the shore despite knowledge that Bacud Reef exists in their navigational map, in order to get cell phone signals. The report also revealed that the captain was intoxicated at the time of accident. This made the negligence and offense more serious But I really doubt if the cell phone signal was the only reason for their venturing close to the coast. The grounding occurred before noon of May 8, 2011, the start of TV telecast of Pacquiao - Mosley fight.
Posts
0 comments:
Post a Comment